Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Pollution Taxation and Revenue Recycling Under Monopoly Unions

Contents:

Author Info

  • Strand, J.

Abstract

We consider a model where a given number of firms decide on a pollution-reducing production technology, and then hire workers who subsequently form a monopoly union which sets the wage. We study the possibility of "double dividents", i.e. simultaneous reduction in pollution and increases in employment, when the pollution tax is increased, and tax revenues recycled, in alternative ways. In all cases overall pollution is then reduced.

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 16/1996.

as in new window
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:1996_016

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
Email:
Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: POLLUTION; ENTERPRISES; TECHNOLOGY; PRODUCTION; WAGES; TRADE UNIONS;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Holmlund, Bertil & Kolm, Ann-Sofie, 1998. "Environmental Tax Reform in a Small Open Economy with Structural Unemployment," Working Paper Series 1997:2, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  2. Chen, Jhy-hwa & Shieh, Jhy-yuan & Chang, Juin-jen & Lai, Ching-chong, 2009. "Growth, welfare and transitional dynamics in an endogenously growing economy with abatement labor," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 423-437, September.
  3. Thorsten Bayındır-Upmann, 2004. "On the Double Dividend under Imperfect Competition," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 28(2), pages 169-194, June.
  4. Thomas Conefrey & John FitzGerald & Laura Malaguzzi Valeri & Richard S. J. Tol, 2008. "The Impact of a Carbon Tax on Economic Growth and Carbon Dioxide Emissions in Ireland," Papers WP251, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
  5. Strand, J., 1995. "Efficient Environmental Taxation Under Worker-Firm Bargaining," Memorandum 19/1995, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  6. Strand, Jon, 1999. "Efficient environmental taxation under moral hazard," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 73-88, March.
  7. Sanz, Nicolas & Schwartz, Sonia, 2013. "Are pollution permit markets harmful for employment?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 374-383.
  8. Anthony Letsoalo & James Blignaut & Theuns de Wet & Martin de Wit & Sebastiaan Hess & Richard S.J. Tol & Jan van Heerden, 2005. "Triple Dividends Of Water Consumption Charges In South Africa," Working Papers FNU-62, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Apr 2005.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:1996_016. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Rhiana Bergh-Seeley).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.