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Exclusive Quality - Why Exclusive Distribution may Benefit the TV-viewers

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Author Info
Stennek, Johan () (Research Institute of Industrial Economics)
Abstract

Sports organizations, Hollywood studios and TV channels grant satellite and cable networks exclusive rights to televise their matches, movies and media contents. Exclusive distribution prevents viewers from watching attractive programs, and reduces the TV-distributors incentives to compete in prices. This paper demonstrates that exclusive distribution may also give providers of contents incentives to invest in higher quality and, as a result, force competitors to reduce their prices. Exclusive distribution may benefit all viewers, including those who are excluded

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File URL: http://www.naringslivsforskning.se/Wfiles/wp/wp691.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 691.

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Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: 09 Jan 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0691

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Postal: Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46 8 665 4500
Fax: +46 8 665 4599
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Web page: http://www.ifn.se/
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Related research
Keywords: Exclusive Contracts Quality Bargaining Avertising Investment

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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