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Customer poaching with differentiated products and switching costs

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Author Info

  • Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl

    ()
    (University of Bergen, Department of Economics)

Abstract

We consider a dynamic two-period model where two firms offer products that are differentiated a la Hotelling. Consumers purchase products in a first period, and in a second period consumers are locked-in to their first-period choice of producer with a switching cost. In the second period firms are able to price discriminate based on consumers purcase history from period 1. We show that i) firms will approach their rival's customers by low prices in the second period (customer poaching) and that ineffcient switching will occur, ii) second-period prices are dependent on first-period market shares, a result in contrast to some of the received literature. Finally, iii) with high enough switching costs first-period prices is below the level in a static setting, and more so the higher the switching costs and the more differentiated the products are.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Bergen, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 09/04.

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Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 06 Nov 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:bergec:2004_009

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Postal: Institutt for √łkonomi, Universitetet i Bergen, Postboks 7802, 5020 Bergen, Norway
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Web page: http://www.uib.no/econ/en
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Related research

Keywords: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets; Production; Pricing; and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms;

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Cited by:
  1. Oz Shy & Rune Stenbacka, 2011. "Customer recognition and competition," Working Papers 11-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
  2. Oz Shy & Rune Stenbacka, 2012. "Investment in customer recognition and information exchange," Working Papers 12-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.

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