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Abstract

For a few decades, a growing literature has examined the role of water resources in interstate conflicts. In line with this literature, this study analyzes the risk of a conflict between countries sharing freshwater. While some scholars claim that water-based conflicts can never occur, this analysis determines this risk by linking it to the size of a negotiation interval; the probability-to-conflict decreasing with this size. In fact, we are going to show that the size of this interval diminishes with scarcer resources and with the degree of the heterogeneity of countries measured by their productive efficiency. Then, in a peace scenario, we determine by bargaining the optimal allocation and we study its variation according to the parameters of the model. These theoretical results will be confirmed by an econometric approach.

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File URL: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/47/27/28/PDF/DTGREQAM2010-04.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number halshs-00472728.

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Date of creation: 13 Apr 2010
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00472728

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00472728/en/
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Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

Related research

Keywords: Conflict Theory; Water-based Conflict; Nash-Bargaining; Dyadic Analysis;

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2010-04-24 (All new papers)
• NEP-CSE-2010-04-24 (Economics of Strategic Management)

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