Visa's Abandoned Plan to Acquire Plaid: What Could Have Been a Textbook Case of a Killer Acquisition
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Other versions of this item:
- Frédéric Marty & Thierry Warin, 2021. "Visa's Abandoned Plan to Acquire Plaid: What Could Have Been a Textbook Case of a Killer Acquisition," CIRANO Working Papers 2021s-39, CIRANO.
- Frédéric Marty & Thierry Warin, 2021. "Visa's Abandoned Plan to Acquire Plaid: What Could Have Been a Textbook Case of a Killer Acquisition," Working Papers halshs-03405108, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
- Biancini, Sara & Ettinger, David, 2017.
"Vertical integration and downstream collusion,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 99-113.
- Sara Biancini & David Ettinger, 2016. "Vertical Integration and Downstream Collusion," CESifo Working Paper Series 5933, CESifo.
- Sara Biancini & David Ettinger, 2017. "Vertical integration and downstream collusion," Post-Print halshs-01615103, HAL.
- Sara Biancini & David Ettinger, 2016. "Vertical Integration and Downstream Collusion," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 2016-09, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Frédéric Marty & Julien Pillot, 2021.
"Cooperation, dependence, and eviction: how platform-to-business coopetition relationships should be addressed in mobile telephony ecosystems,"
Post-Print
halshs-03202013, HAL.
- Frédéric Marty & Julien Pillot, 2021. "Cooperation, dependence, and eviction: how platform-to-business coopetition relationships should be addressed in mobile telephony ecosystems," SciencePo Working papers Main halshs-03202013, HAL.
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More about this item
Keywords
Mergers control; Fintech; Killer acquisitions; Digital ecosystems; Foreclosure; damages to innovation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
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