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Does Competition for the Field Improve Cost Efficiency? Evidence from the London Bus Tendering Model

Author

Listed:
  • Stéphane Saussier

    (IAE Paris - Sorbonne Business School)

  • Anne Yvrande-Billon
  • Miguel Amaral

Abstract

In this paper we investigate the relationship between auctions’ results and the number of bidders for local transportation contracts in London. Using an original database concerning 294 local transportation routes we find that a higher number of bidders is associated with a lower cost of service. This finding, in addition of being one of the first empirical test of a crucial and understudied theoretical issue has important policy implications, especially for countries in which bids are organized such that only few bidders are allowed to answer (e.g. France).
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Suggested Citation

  • Stéphane Saussier & Anne Yvrande-Billon & Miguel Amaral, 2013. "Does Competition for the Field Improve Cost Efficiency? Evidence from the London Bus Tendering Model," Post-Print halshs-02159375, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02159375
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    JEL classification:

    • H0 - Public Economics - - General
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out

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