Joint Audit, Game Theory, and Impairment-Testing Disclosures
AbstractWe examine the consequences on impairment testing disclosures of auditor-pair choice made by French listed companies where two (joint) auditors are required by law. Managers are likely to manipulate impairment-testing disclosures since it relies on unverifiable fair value estimates (e.g., goodwill). From a simple game theory model, we demonstrate that a Big-4 auditor paired with a non-Big 4 auditor increase auditors' incentives to force firms to disclose more because Big 4 auditor fully bears reputation costs. Using a disclosure score for firms composing the French SBF 120 index from 2006 to 2009, we provide evidence that combination of Big 4 / non-Big 4 auditors generate higher impairment-related disclosures levels whereas the other combinations, i.e. two Big 4 or two non-Big 4, tend to decrease the level of impairment-related disclosures. These empirical results are consistent with our model predictions and robust to various controls variables (e.g., size, risk, year and firm fixed effects).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00671613.
Date of creation: 29 Mar 2012
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Publication status: Published - Presented, 1er Workshop "Audit" - EM Lyon / IAE Poitiers / Université Paris-Dauphine, 2012, Ecully, France
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Joint Audit; Impairment Test; Game Theory; Prisoner's Dilemma; Disclosures; IAS 36;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-04-10 (All new papers)
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