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Mesure opérationnelle de la valeur partenariale et sa répartition

Author

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  • Mohamed Ali Khaldi

    (CERAG - Centre d'études et de recherches appliquées à la gestion - UGA [2016-2019] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019])

Abstract

The objective of this article is to propose a model of measure of stakeholder value and its appropriation. Our model leans on that of Charreaux (2007). On one hand, we propose an extension of the approach in an evaluation of the stakeholder value exceeding the borders of a single sector. On the other hand, this approach will be perfected by defining more precisely the categories of contributors of resources, by distinguishing the creditors from the shareholders among the investors. This model is illustrated on a benchmark basis made up of 553 companies and 1659 observations distributed in eight business sectors.Globally, the stakeholder value created in 2008 in Europe increased by 13,1 % compared to 2006. In 2010 the increase was 4,9 % compared to 2008. This low progress, can be attributed to the crisis and the economic slowdown which followed. In terms of appropriation, sectors favourable to the investors (financial creditors and shareholders), to the employees as well as to the firm are capital intensive and technological sectors. These sectors have more needs in capital hence the greater power of these stakeholders in the division of the organizational rent. Sectors favourable to the customers are the ones where substitute products are easily available and the cost of changing supplier is low. The suppliers have more bargaining power in the sectors where the cost of change of the latter is raised because of a strong brand or much differentiated products. This study supplies a dashboard of the distribution of the stakeholder value by the stakeholders in Europe.

Suggested Citation

  • Mohamed Ali Khaldi, 2016. "Mesure opérationnelle de la valeur partenariale et sa répartition," Post-Print hal-01900615, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01900615
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01900615
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    References listed on IDEAS

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