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Utilitarian Aggregation with Heterogeneous Beliefs

Author

Listed:
  • Antoine Billot

    (LEMMA - Laboratoire d'économie mathématique et de microéconomie appliquée - UP2 - Université Panthéon-Assas)

  • Xiangyu Qu

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The utilitarian aggregation rule requires social utility and beliefs to be a convex combination of individual utilities and beliefs, respectively. Since, in the case of belief heterogeneity, the standard Pareto condition is incompatible with such a separate aggregation, a new condition, called the belief-proof Pareto condition, is proposed to alleviate occurrences of spurious agreement by restricting unanimity to beliefs that can be considered reasonable by society. Then, we show, in the Anscombe-Aumann (Theorems 1) and the Savage (Theorems 2) framework, that the belief-proof Pareto condition is equivalent to separate aggregation of individual beliefs and tastes.

Suggested Citation

  • Antoine Billot & Xiangyu Qu, 2020. "Utilitarian Aggregation with Heterogeneous Beliefs ," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-03034701, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-03034701
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180344
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03034701
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shiri Alon & Gabi Gayer, 2016. "Utilitarian Preferences With Multiple Priors," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 1181-1201, May.
    2. Mongin Philippe, 1995. "Consistent Bayesian Aggregation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 313-351, August.
    3. Hylland, Aanund & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1979. "The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(6), pages 1321-1336, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Askoura, Youcef & Billot, Antoine, 2021. "Social decision for a measure society," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    2. Pivato, Marcus, 2022. "Bayesian social aggregation with accumulating evidence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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