An Economic Mechanism to Regulate Multispecies Fisheries
AbstractWe study the management of a multispecies fishery, exploited under a non-selective harvesting technology. We construct an economic mechanism to regulate the fishery. Under a large class of models, capable of accounting for imperfect competition, congestion externalities, pro-social motivations and/or resource amenities, we show that any (stationary Markovian) Nash equilibrium of the differential game induced by our economic mechanism implements an optimal utilization of the resource. Using a specification of the general model, which adapts Clemhout and Wan (1985) and can be solved explicitly, we exhibit a (stationary Markovian) Nash equilibrium of the differential game, proving existence of (stationary Markovian) Nash equilibria within this environment.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée in its series Cahiers du GREThA with number 2012-23.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
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Natural resource; Fish war; Multispecies; Differential game; Mechanism design.;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-10-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2012-10-27 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-ENV-2012-10-27 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-10-27 (Game Theory)
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