Why are connections to editorial board members of economics journals valuable?

Using novel and large-scale data, we estimate the causal effect of being connected to an editorial board member of an economics journal on a department’s or coauthor’s success in publishing in the journal. Prior studies suggests that editors are helping colleagues not themselves and that connections lead to markedly better papers. Instead, we explicitly take into account that authors and editorial board members are not two distinct sets of persons and find that of the overall 27% increase in a department’s annual publication record in a journal, 73% is thanks to the increase in the number of publications by editorial board members themselves. At the individual level, co-authors publish 7% more articles in the journal, excluding the work with the editorial board member. More editorial power, captured by the member’s role in the submission process, and long service on the editorial board lead to substantially larger increases. We analyze various mechanisms. Rather than a marked increase in quality thanks to connections, we find no such increase (nor signs of favoritism). Analysis of individual-level connections suggests that connections act as signals of a coauthor’s quality.