Macroeconomics and Politics Revisited. Do Central Banks Matter?
AbstractThis paper provides a model encompassing both partisan influences on monetary policy and the issue of central bank independence. In a regime of partial independence, central bank's policy responses are not immune from partisan influences. Still, the latter fail to affect systematically the expected output level in election years. The predictions of the model are consistent with the empirical literature on partisan cycles and account for some of its controversial findings. Copyright 2000 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow in its series Working Papers with number 9612.
Date of creation: Jul 1996
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- M. Lossani & P. Natale & P. Tirelli, 2000. "Macroeconomics and Politics Revisited: Do central banks Matter?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 53-67, 03.
- NEP-ALL-1998-08-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-1998-08-21 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-PBE-1998-08-21 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PKE-1998-06-03 (Post Keynesian Economics)
- NEP-POL-1998-08-21 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-PUB-1998-08-21 (Public Finance)
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- Franck, Raphaël & Krausz, Miriam, 2008. "Why separate monetary policy from banking supervision?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 388-411, September.
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