An Outcome-Oriented Theory of Choice and Empirical Paradoxes in Expected Utility Theory
AbstractI analyze observed choice between lotteries from an outcome-oriented point of view in the framework of choice between random variables. I characterize a choice maker, who faces a choice situation between lotteries, by (1) a surmising process that associates, with a pair of lotteries, a set of well-defined cjoice situations between random variables, and (2) a choice set that is a collection of well-defined choice situations. I give a partial axiomatic foundation of the theory. The theory is applied to explain the well-known paradoxes in expected utility theory.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Yale - Economic Growth Center in its series Papers with number 774.
Length: 66 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
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UTILITY FUNCTION ; UNCERTAINTY;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
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