The purpose of this paper is to analyze bargaining between a firm and a finite set of workers. In particular employment choice and the payoffs in equilibrium are studied. In the model, the firm first selects the workers it wants to hire. The selected workers then decide whether they want to proceed in bargaining with the firm. Finally, bargaining takes place. We assume contracts are binding.
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Paper provided by Uppsala - Working Paper Series in its series Papers with number
1998-1.
Length: 25 pages Date of creation: 1998 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:uppaal:1998-1
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand