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Arrow`s Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem as Special Cases of a Single Theorem

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Author Info
Eliaz, K.

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Abstract

This paper shows that both Arrow`s Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem follow from a single impossibility theorem. This theorem states that two properties - Pareto efficiency and a condition called Preference Reversal - lead to the dictatorship result.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tel Aviv in its series Papers with number 2001-11.

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Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:teavfo:2001-11

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Postal: Israel TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY, THE FOERDER INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, RAMAT AVIV 69 978 TEL AVIV ISRAEL.
Phone: 972-3-640-9255
Fax: 972-3-640-5815
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Web page: http://econ.tau.ac.il/research/foerder.asp
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Related research
Keywords: EFFICIENCY ; SOCIAL ASPECTS ; PREFERENCES;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-16.

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