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Support Networks within the Family As a Public Good Problem

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Author Info
Schoeni, R.F.

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Abstract

his paper examines altruism and exchange models of familial relationships. It first examines the predictions of these models when there are more than two family members, demonstrating that altruism with multiple altruists is similar to the classic public good model. The paper also examines predictions of the altruism model under the assumption that the child acts strategically. It is traditionally assumed that parents unilaterally determine the amount of assistance they provide to their child. However, if one allows strategic behavior by the child, the classic prediction of complete neutralization of redistributive policies does not hold. Empirical analyses do not overwhelmingly support either of the two models; other motivations are likely to be important.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by RAND - Labor and Population Program in its series Papers with number 00-06.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:randlp:00-06

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Postal: RAND, Labor and Population Program, 1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138 Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138.
Phone: (310) 393-0411, x7359
Web page: http://www.rand.org/organization/drd/labor/
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Related research
Keywords: ALTRUISM ; FAMILY ; PUBLIC GOODS;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J10 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - General
H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General

Cited by:
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  1. Audrey Light & Kathleen McGarry, 2003. "Why Parents Play Favorites: Explanations for Unequal Bequests," NBER Working Papers 9745, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Audrey Light & Kathleen McGarry, 2003. "Why Parents Play Favorites: Explanations for Unequal Bequests," Working Papers 03-01, Ohio State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Donald Cox, 2003. "Private Transfers within the Family: Mothers, Fathers, Sons and Daughters," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 605, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-16.


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