Heterogeneous Dynasties and the Political Economy of Public Debt
AbstractWe consider a small open overlapping generation economy with descending altruism. We introduce heterogeneity within dynasties by assuming that each parent procreates a fixed proportion of selfsh children at each generation. Altruistic parents can recognize the type of each children and tike into account when bequeathing. there is no Ricardian equivalence and an active public intergenerational transfer policy is attractive to altruism dynasty members, although there may be no unanimity among them. We display reasonable conditions for indirect preferences to be single-peaked and we apply the median voter theorem.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales in its series Papers with number 225.
Length: 53 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: FACULTE UNIVERSITAIRE NOTRE-DAME DE LA PAIX, FACULTE DES SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES ET SOCIALES, RUE DE BRUXELLES NAMUR FRANCE.
Web page: http://www.fundp.ac.be/facultes/eco/
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ALTRUISM ; SOCIAL CHOICE;
Other versions of this item:
- de Walque, Gregory & Gevers, Louis, 2001. " Heterogeneous Dynasties and the Political Economy of Public Debt," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 103(3), pages 369-89, September.
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice - - - Intertemporal Household Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
- H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
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- Grégory de Walque, 2005.
"Voting on Pensions: A Survey,"
Journal of Economic Surveys,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(2), pages 181-209, 04.
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