The possibility of cooperation in a repeated prisoner's dilemma without memory is investigated in an evolutionary framework where 1) some agents ('Vulcans') are morally commited to cooperation, 2) some others ('Klingons') are not commited at all, and 3) there is random matching.
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Paper provided by Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales in its series Papers with number
169.
Length: 22 pages Date of creation: 1996 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:nodapa:169
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
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