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Extending Market Power through Vertical Integration

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Author Info

  • de Fontenay, C.
  • Gans, J.S.

Abstract

This paper derives a model of vertical integration when it is difficult to write binding long-term supply price contracts. Thus, a vertical separated monopolist is vulnerable to hold-up. Without integration, the authors demonstrate that a bottleneck monopolist has an incentive to encourage more firms in a related segment than would arise in a pure monopoly.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by New South Wales - School of Economics in its series Papers with number 99/2.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:nesowa:99/2

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Postal: THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES, SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, P.O.B. 1 KENSINGTON, NEW SOUTH WALES 2033 AUSTRALIA.
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Web page: http://www.economics.unsw.edu.au/
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Keywords: MONOPOLIES ; MARKET STRUCTURE ; VERTICAL INTEGRATION;

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Cited by:
  1. King, S.P., 2000. "Does Structure Dominate Regulation? The Case of an Input Monopolist," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 767, The University of Melbourne.
  2. de Fontenay, Catherine C. & Gans, Joshua S., 2004. "Can vertical integration by a monopsonist harm consumer welfare?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 821-834, June.

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