In this paper we study whether majority voting equilibria exist when preferences over public policies are not single-peaked. The government levies a proportional income tax. Tax revennues is used to finance a uniform lump-sum transfer and public education. Individuals vote on the composition of the government budget. We show that the single-crossing property cannot be invoked to establish existence of a majority voting equilibrium.
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Paper provided by Michigan State - Econometrics and Economic Theory in its series Papers with number
9903.
Length: 29 pages Date of creation: 1999 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:mistet:9903
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
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