Composition of Government Budget, Non-Single Peakedness and Majority Voting
AbstractIn this paper we study whether majority voting equilibria exist when preferences over public policies are not single-peaked. The government levies a proportional income tax. Tax revennues is used to finance a uniform lump-sum transfer and public education. Individuals vote on the composition of the government budget. We show that the single-crossing property cannot be invoked to establish existence of a majority voting equilibrium.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Michigan State - Econometrics and Economic Theory in its series Papers with number 9903.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, EAST LANSING MICHIGAN 48824 U.S.A.
Web page: http://econ.msu.edu/
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VOTING ; TAXES;
Other versions of this item:
- Bearse, Peter & Glomm, Gerhard & Janeba, Eckhard, 2001. " Composition of Government Budget, Non-single Peakedness, and Majority Voting," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(4), pages 471-81.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
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- John Creedy & Shuyun May Li & Solmaz Moslehi, 2009.
"The Composition of Government Expenditure in an Overlapping Generations Model,"
Department of Economics - Working Papers Series
1064, The University of Melbourne.
- John Creedy & Shuyun May Li & Solmaz Moslehi, 2008. "The Composition of Government Expenditure in an Overlapping Generations Model," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1043, The University of Melbourne.
- Gilat Levy, 2004. "Public Education for the Minority,Private Education for the Majority," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /2004/470, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Creedy, John & Moslehi, Solmaz, 2009.
"Modelling the composition of government expenditure in democracies,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 42-55, March.
- John Creedy & Solmaz Moslehi, 2007. "Modelling the Composition of Government Expenditure in Democracies," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1007, The University of Melbourne.
- John Creedy & Solmaz Moslehi, 2008. "Voting over Taxes and Expenditure: The Role of Home Production," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1052, The University of Melbourne.
- Gilat Levy, 2005.
"The Politics of Public Provision of Education,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 120(4), pages 1507-1534, November.
- Levy, Gilat, 2005. "The politics of public provision of education," Open Access publications from London School of Economics and Political Science http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/, London School of Economics and Political Science.
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