We propose a model of a random normal game for given (finite nonempty) sets of players and pure strategies; this model is shown to be canonical in a certain sense.
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Paper provided by Minnesota - Center for Economic Research in its series Papers with number
306.
Length: 45 pages Date of creation: 1999 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:minner:306
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Herings,P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters,Ronald J.A.P., 2001.
"Equilibrium Selection in Stochastic Games,"
Research Memoranda
009, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
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