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The Expected Number of Nash Equilibria of a Normal Form Game

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Author Info

  • McLennan, A.

Abstract

We propose a model of a random normal game for given (finite nonempty) sets of players and pure strategies; this model is shown to be canonical in a certain sense.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Minnesota - Center for Economic Research in its series Papers with number 306.

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Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:minner:306

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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, MINNEAPOLIS MINNESOTA 35455 U.S.A.
Phone: (612)625-6353
Fax: (612)624-0209
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Web page: http://www.econ.umn.edu/
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Keywords: GAME THEORY ; ECONOMIC MODELS;

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Cited by:
  1. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters, Ronald, 2006. "Homotopy Methods to Compute Equilibria in Game Theory," Research Memorandum 046, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  2. Wheatley, W. Parker, 2003. "Survival And Ownership Of Internet Marketplaces For Agriculture," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada 22214, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  3. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters, Ronald J. A. P., 2004. "Stationary equilibria in stochastic games: structure, selection, and computation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 32-60, September.
  4. Klaus Kultti & Hannu Salonen & Hannu Vartiainen, 2011. "Distribution of pure Nash equilibria in n-person games with random best replies," Discussion Papers 71, Aboa Centre for Economics.
  5. Ariel Pakes, 2008. "Theory and Empirical Work on Imperfectly Competitive Markets," NBER Working Papers 14117, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Sophie Bade & Guillaume Haeringer & Ludovic Renou, 2005. "More strategies, more Nash equilibria," Game Theory and Information 0502001, EconWPA.
  7. Stephen Ryan & Patrick Bajari & Han Hong, 2005. "Identification and Estimation of Discrete Games of Complete Information," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 53, Society for Computational Economics.
  8. Lee, Robin S. & Pakes, Ariel, 2009. "Multiple equilibria and selection by learning in an applied setting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 13-16, July.
  9. Andreas Park & Lones Smith, 2008. "Caller Number Five and Related Timing Games," Working Papers tecipa-317, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  10. Conitzer, Vincent & Sandholm, Tuomas, 2008. "New complexity results about Nash equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 621-641, July.
  11. Takahashi, Satoru, 2008. "The number of pure Nash equilibria in a random game with nondecreasing best responses," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 328-340, May.
  12. McLennan, Andrew & Berg, Johannes, 2005. "Asymptotic expected number of Nash equilibria of two-player normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 264-295, May.

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