We investigate whether competition between two firms to hire managers with different abilities might affect the product markets efficiency, when a manager's effort once hired is or her private information. We conclude that competition for managers might lead to an efficiency improvement in the market of the firm that attracts the most efficient manager.
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Length: 7 pages Date of creation: 1997 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:inecpu:158
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