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Competition in Environmental Labeling

Author

Listed:
  • Ibanez, L.

Abstract

This paper analyzes environmental labeling strategies in a duopoly market. We consider a three-stage game where firms successively choose their production technology, label signal and price. The willingness to pay for the environmental quality is explained by an altruistic parameter as consumers are volontarily contributing to the preservation of the environment, which is a public good.

Suggested Citation

  • Ibanez, L., 1999. "Competition in Environmental Labeling," Papers 99.524, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:gremaq:99.524
    as

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Chambolle, Claire & Giraud-Heraud, Eric, 2002. "Certification of Origin and Brands Competition," 2002 International Congress, August 28-31, 2002, Zaragoza, Spain 24976, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    2. Zago, Angelo M. & Pick, Daniel H., 2004. "Labeling Policies in Food Markets: Private Incentives, Public Intervention, and Welfare Effects," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 29(1), pages 1-16, April.
    3. Crespi, John M. & Marette, Stephan, 2003. "Some Economic Implications Of Public Labeling," Journal of Food Distribution Research, Food Distribution Research Society, vol. 34(3), pages 1-12, November.
    4. Price, Colin, 8. "Buying certification: pigs in pokes, warm glows, and unexploded," Scandinavian Forest Economics: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Scandinavian Society of Forest Economics, Scandinavian Society of Forest Economics, issue 41, May.
    5. Price, Colin, 2007. "Sustainable forest management, pecuniary externalities and invisible stakeholders," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(7), pages 751-762, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ENVIRONMENT ; LABELS ; OLIGOPOLIES ; ASYMETRIC INFORMATION;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • L19 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Other

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