We study the performance of English and second price auctions in which the seller sets an optimal reserve price given his beliefs. We define the effectivess of an auction as the ration between the expected revenue it generated for the seller and the expected valuation of the object to the bidder with the highest valuation (total surplus).
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Paper provided by Boston University - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number
95.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
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