Prime objects of this note are (I) excess demand generated by price-taking economic agents, and (II) an alternative version of tatonnement. We relate laws of demand, axioms of revealed preferences, and other notions of generalized monotonicity to "evolutionary stable" prices. Focus is on local stability of competitive equilibrium. Specifically, we establish that evolutionary stable prices are asymptotically attractive under so-called replicator dynamics.
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Length: 14 pages Date of creation: 1999 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:bereco:0699
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General