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Property Rights, Incomplete Contracts, and Social Harm

Author

Listed:
  • Pitchford, R.
  • Snyder, C.M.

Abstract

The authors construct a model in which a first mover decides on its location before it knows the identity of the second mover; joint location results in a negative externality. Contracts are inherently incomplete since the first mover's initial decision cannot be specified. The authors analyze several kinds of rights, including damages, injunctions, and rights to exclude (arising from covenants or land ownership).

Suggested Citation

  • Pitchford, R. & Snyder, C.M., 1999. "Property Rights, Incomplete Contracts, and Social Harm," Papers 365, Australian National University - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:aunaec:365
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    Cited by:

    1. Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson, 2004. "Is There a Hold‐up Problem?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(3), pages 475-494, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    PROPERTY RIGHTS ; EXTERNALITIES ; GAME THEORY;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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