The Paradox of New Members in the EU Council of Ministers: A Non-cooperative Bargaining Analysis
AbstractPower indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may increase the power of an existing member, even if the number of votes of all existing members and the decision rule remain constant. This phenomenon is known as the paradox of new members. This paper uses the leading model of majoritarian bargaining and shows that the paradox is predicted in equilibrium for past EU enlargements. Furthermore, a majority of members would have been in favor of the 1981 enlargement even if members were bargaining over a fixed budget.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2010.123.
Date of creation: Oct 2010
Date of revision:
Majoritarian Bargaining; Weighted Voting; Power Measures; EU Enlargement; Paradox of New Members;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-11-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-11-06 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EEC-2010-11-06 (European Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2010-11-06 (Game Theory)
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