Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Predicting the Deforestation–Trend Under Different Carbon–Prices

Contents:

Author Info

  • Georg E. Kindermann

    (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA))

  • Michael Obersteiner

    (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA))

  • Ewald Rametsteiner

    (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA))

  • Ian McCallcum

    (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA))

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Background: Global carbon stocks in forest biomass are decreasing by 1.1 Gt of carbon annually, owing to continued deforestation and forest degradation. Deforestation emissions are partly offset by forest expansion and increases in growing stock primarily in the extra-tropical north. Innovative financial mechanisms would be required to help reducing deforestation. Using a spatially explicit integrated biophysical and socio-economic land use model we estimated the impact of carbon price incentive schemes and payment modalities on deforestation. One payment modality is adding costs for carbon emission, the other is to pay incentives for keeping the forest carbon stock intact. Results, Baseline scenario calculations show that close to 200mil ha or around 5% of today’s forest area will be lost between 2006 and 2025, resulting in a release of additional 17.5 GtC. Today’s forest cover will shrink by around 500 million hectares, which is 1/8 of the current forest cover, within the next 100 years. The accumulated carbon release during the next 100 years amounts to 45 GtC, which is 15% of the total carbon stored in forests today. Incentives of 6 US$/tC for the standing biomass paid every 5 years will bring deforestation down by 50%. This will cause costs of 34 billion US$/year. On the other hand a carbon tax of 12$/tC harvested forest biomass will also cut deforestation by half. The tax income will decrease from 6 billion US$ in 2005 to 4.3 billion US$ in 2025 and 0.7 billion US$ in 2100 due to decreasing deforestation speed. Conclusions, Avoiding deforestation requires financial mechanisms that make retention of forests economically competitive with the currently often preferred option to seek profits from other land uses. Incentive payments need to be at a very high level to be effective against deforestation. Taxes on the other hand will generate budgetary revenues by the regions which are already poor. A combination of incentives and taxes could turn out to be a viable solution for this dilemma. Increasing the value of forest land and thereby make it less easily prone to deforestation would act as a strong incentive to increase productivity of agricultural and fuelwood production, which could be supported by revenues generated by the deforestation tax.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.feem.it/userfiles/attach/Publication/NDL2007/NDL2007-029.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2007.29.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: Mar 2007
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2007.29

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Corso Magenta, 63 - 20123 Milan
    Phone: 0039-2-52036934
    Fax: 0039-2-52036946
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.feem.it/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: Deforestation; Carbon Prices;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2007.29. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (barbara racah).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.