Dynamic Controllability with Overlapping targets: A Generalization of the Tinbergen-Nash Theory of Economic Policy
AbstractWe generalize some recent results developed in static policy games with multiple players, to a dynamic context. We find that the classical theory of economic policy can be usefully applied to a strategic context of difference games: if one player satisfies the Golden Rule, then either all other players’ policies are ineffective with respect to the dynamic target variables shared with that player; or no Nash Feedback Equilibrium can exist, unless they all share target values for those variables. We extend those results to the case where there are also non-dynamic targets, to show that policy effectiveness (a Nash equilibrium) can continue to exist if some players satisfy the Golden Rule but target values differ between players in the non-dynamic targets. We demonstrate the practical importance of these results by showing how policy effectiveness (a policy equilibrium) can appear or disappear with small variations in the expectations process or policy rule in a widely used model of monetary policy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2005.130.
Date of creation: Oct 2005
Date of revision:
Policy games; Policy ineffectiveness; Static controllability; Existence of equilibria; Nash feedback equilibrium;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-12-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2005-12-09 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MAC-2005-12-09 (Macroeconomics)
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