Conspiracies and secret price discounts in the marketplace: Evidence from field experiments
AbstractWe explore collusion by using the tools of experimental economics in a naturally occurring marketplace. We report that competitive price theory adequately organizes data in multilateral decentralized bargaining markets without conspiratorial opportunities. When conspiratorial opportunities are allowed and contract prices are perfectly observed, prices (quantities) are considerably above (below) competitive levels. When sellers receive imperfect price signals, outcomes are intermediate to those of competitive markets and collusive markets with full information. Finally, experienced buyers serve as a catalyst to thwart attempts by sellers to engage in anticompetitive pricing: in periods where experienced agents transact in the market, average transaction prices are below those realized in periods where only inexperienced agents execute trades.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Field Experiments Website in its series Framed Field Experiments with number 00115.
Date of creation: 2005
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Web page: http://www.fieldexperiments.com
Other versions of this item:
- John A. List & Michael K. Price, 2005. "Conspiraces and Secret Price Discounts in the Marketplace: Evidence from Field Experiments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(3), pages 700-717, Autumn.
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- Omar Al-Ubaydli & Peter Boettke, 2011.
"Markets as Economizers of Information: Field Experimental Examination of the "Hayek Hypothesis","
1025, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
- Omar Al-Ubaydli & Peter Boettke, 2012. "Markets as economizers of information: Field experimental examination of the 'hayek hypothesis'," Framed Field Experiments 00195, The Field Experiments Website.
- Al-Ubaydli, Omar & Boettke, Peter, 2010. "Markets as economizers of information: Field experimental examination of the “Hayek Hypothesis”," MPRA Paper 27660, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jonathan E. Alevy & Michael K. Price, 2012. "Advice and Fictive Learning: The Pricing of Assets in the Laboratory," Working Papers 2012-07, University of Alaska Anchorage, Department of Economics.
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