Social Distance and Reciprocity
AbstractContrary to the predictions of non-cooperative game theory, trust and reciprocity are commonly reported in simple games. We conduct a one-shot investment game to examine how social distance affects behavior in two-person exchanges. Two aspects of social distance are examined: ex post revelation of complete information on the second playerÃ¢??s choice set and ex post revelation of information regarding the second playerÃ¢??s identity. The results indicate that reciprocity is not affected by knowledge of the choice set, but depends critically on the possible revelation of the decision makerÃ¢??s identity. That is, the possibility that the second playerÃ¢??s identity (picture) is revealed to his/her counterpart has a profound effect on the degree of reciprocity extended.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University in its series Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series with number 2006-27.
Date of creation: Mar 2006
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-06-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2007-06-11 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2007-06-11 (Game Theory)
- NEP-SOC-2007-06-11 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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