This paper interprets the Maastricht convergence criteria as an incentive mechanism that offers entry into European Monetary Union (EMU) as an uncertain reward for candidate countries' convergence efforts. Similarly, under the "stability pact" agreed at the Dublin summit in December 1996 countries risk penalties for insufficient discipline inside EMU. The paper suggests a partial trade-off between the entry conditions and the stability pact.
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Paper provided by European University Institute in its series Economics Working Papers with number
eco97/02.
Length: 27 pages Date of creation: 1997 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco97/02
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Find related papers by JEL classification: F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
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