Obtaining information by diversifying projects or why specialization is inefficient
AbstractWe examine how diversification of projects assigned to an agency can enhance efficiency by informing a principal of the agency’s quality. Projects that appear inefficient in isolation may be justified when assigned to the same agency. Assigning different tasks to different special purpose governments, though allowing for technical efficiency in the management of each project, may nevertheless reduce overall efficiency.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën in its series Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers with number ces0815.
Date of creation: Jun 2008
Date of revision:
Special purpose governments; Asymmetric information; Bureaucracy; Project evaluation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- H43 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Project Evaluation; Social Discount Rate
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-10-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2008-10-07 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-PPM-2008-10-07 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Karla Vander Weyden).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.