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Legislation and Countervailing Effects from Social Norms

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Author Info
Francesco Parisi
Georg von Wangenheim ()
Abstract

Human behavior is influenced both by internal norms or values ("what people think to be just behavior") and exogenous restrictions including legal sanctions. In the paper we study the interaction between these legal and extralegal forces and highlight the possibility of a countervailing effect of norms and individual in the face of changes in the legal environment. Building on the stylized fact that people's individual values are partly static and partly subject to change overtime, we consider these social and legal forces as two main factors that contribute to the change in individual values. Legal innovation that departs from current values may lead to private enforcement norms or civil disobedience. Through private enforcement of expressive laws and through civil disobedience, individuals reveal their approbation or disapproval of laws to other individuals. This may lead to a hysteresis effect on individual values that may have a reinforcing or countervailing effect on the legal innovation. Our model of countervailing norms complements the existing literature on expressive law by showing conditions under which the equilibrium behavior may move in the opposite direction from that intended by the law. Our model studies the dynamics of such problem and unveils several important predictions and practical implications for the design of law.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group in its series Papers on Econonmics and Evolution with number 2004-03.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:esi:evopap:2004-03

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Keywords: Expressive law Social Norms Civil Disobedience Legislation Custom

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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  1. Ben Depoorter & Francesco Parisi & Sven Vanneste, 2005. "Problems with the Enforcement of Copyright Law: Is there a Social Norm Backlash?," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 12(3), pages 361-369, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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