Dividing one euro democratically
AbstractIn this paper, concepts from the theory of electoral competition are applied to the classical problem of dividing one unit of a homogeneous good. If the Uncovered set selects almost all divisions, other concepts (Minimal Covering set, Bipartisan set) predict that very unequal divisions are not selected.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 99-23.
Date of creation: 1999
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Other versions of this item:
- Laslier, J.-F. & Picard, N., 1999. "Dividing One Euro, Democratically," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. 99-23, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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- LASLIER, Jean-FranÃ§ois & PICARD, Nathalie, 2000. "Distributive politics: does electoral competition promote inequality ?," CORE Discussion Papers, UniversitÃ© catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 2000022, UniversitÃ© catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Laslier, Jean-Francois & Picard, Nathalie, 2002. "Distributive Politics and Electoral Competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 106-130, March.
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