Sincere Scoring Rules
AbstractApproval Voting is shown to be the unique scoring rule that leads strategic voters to sincere behavior of three candidates elections in Poisson Games. However, Approval Voting can lead to insincere behavior in elections with more than three candidates.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 2010-02.
Date of creation: 2010
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Sincerity; Approval Voting; Scoring rules; Poisson Games;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-05-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-05-15 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2010-05-15 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2010-05-15 (Positive Political Economics)
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- Ulle Endriss, 2013. "Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 335-355, March.
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