IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/els/esrcls/025.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Evolutionary Dynamics of Populations with a Local Interaction Structure

Author

Listed:
  • Ilan Eshel
  • Emilia Sansone
  • Avner Shaked

Abstract

A model of a population with a Local Interaction structure is presented. Individuals interact with others in a given Interaction neighborhood to obtain their payoff. Individuals either imitate or else they die and are replaced by one of their neighbors in another neighborhood- the Propagation neighborhood. An individual with a higher payoff is more likely to be imitated or to replace his neighbor. An unbeatable strategy can repel the invasion of any mutant. We show that the (unique, if it exists) unbeatable strategy is an ESS of a population game with inclu- sive tness parameter which depends on the size of the interaction and propagation neighborhoods. We analyze the evolution of altruistic traits in such populations and observe that allowing the players more information eases the development of altruistic behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Ilan Eshel & Emilia Sansone & Avner Shaked, "undated". "Evolutionary Dynamics of Populations with a Local Interaction Structure," ELSE working papers 025, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
    • Handle: RePEc:els:esrcls:025
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: ftp://ftp.repec.org/RePEc/els/esrcls/ilanmast.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Outkin, Alexander V., 2003. "Cooperation and local interactions in the Prisoners' Dilemma Game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(4), pages 481-503, December.
    2. Ilan Eshel & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked, "undated". "Altruists Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model," ELSE working papers 005, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
    3. Zakaria Babutsidze, 2009. "Learning How to Consume and Returns to Product Promotion," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2009-05, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
    4. Tone Dieckmann, 1997. "The Evolution of conventions with Mobile Players," Economics Department Working Paper Series n720897, Department of Economics, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
    5. Zakaria Babutsidze, 2011. "Returns to product promotion when consumers are learning how to consume," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 21(5), pages 783-801, December.
    6. Babutsidze, Zakaria & Cowan, Robin, 2009. "Inertia, Interaction and Clustering in Demand," MERIT Working Papers 2009-045, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:els:esrcls:025. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: s. malkani (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/elucluk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.