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Stretching the financial boundaries: how Mexico fostered competition among foreign banks and borrowed cheaply in 1899, 1904 and 1910

Author

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  • Leonardo Weller

    (Escola de Economia de São Paulo)

Abstract

"This paper shows that the Mexican loans of 1899, 1904 and 1910 were issued at a risk premium below the Mexican risk. Based on a wide collection of primary sources, it argues that this cheap borrowing only happened because of the aggressive approach of Finance Minister Limantour when negotiation with European and US bankers, including Bleichroeder, Paribas and Speyers. Instead of acting in favour of rent-seeking interests or in alliance with foreign capitalists, high officials of the Porfirian state successfully arranged the loans according to the interests of the National Treasury."

Suggested Citation

  • Leonardo Weller, 2013. "Stretching the financial boundaries: how Mexico fostered competition among foreign banks and borrowed cheaply in 1899, 1904 and 1910," Working Papers 13023, Economic History Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehs:wpaper:13023
    as

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    File URL: http://www.ehs.org.uk/dotAsset/37af5415-9912-48dc-91c5-628f82b3ec56.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Maurer, Noel & Gomberg, Andrei, 2004. "When the State is Untrustworthy: Public Finance and Private Banking in Porfirian Mexico," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(4), pages 1087-1107, December.
    2. Ficker, Sandra Kuntz, 2002. "Nuevas series del comercio exterior de México, 1870–1929," Revista de Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(2), pages 213-270, September.
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    JEL classification:

    • N00 - Economic History - - General - - - General

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