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A simple model of an international lender of last resort

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  • Goodhart, C. A. E.
  • Huang, Haizhou

Abstract

This paper develops a simple model of an international lender of last resort (ILOLR). The World economy consists of many open economies, each with its own banking system and its own central bank which uses its reserves to manage a pegged exchange rate. The fragility of the banking system and the limited ability of a domestic central bank to provide international liquidity together can cause currency and banking crises. An international interbank market can help an economy with the needed international liquidity, but this risk-sharing also comes with potential costs of international financial contagion. Such international contagious risk is much higher when there is an international interbank market than otherwise. An ILOLR can play a useful role in providing international liquidity and reducing international contagion.

Suggested Citation

  • Goodhart, C. A. E. & Huang, Haizhou, 1999. "A simple model of an international lender of last resort," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119112, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:119112
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/119112/
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Roberto Chang & Andres Velasco, 1998. "Financial crises in emerging markets: a canonical model," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 98-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    2. Stanley Fischer, 1999. "On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 85-104, Fall.
    3. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 2004. "Coordination risk and the price of debt," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 133-153, February.
    4. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2001. "Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 287-327, April.
    5. Mr. Haizhou Huang & Mr. C. A. E. Goodhart, 1999. "A Model of the Lender of Last Resort," IMF Working Papers 1999/039, International Monetary Fund.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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