How avoiding overreaction to public information? Some insights on central bank communication practices
AbstractIt is argued in literature that transparency may be detrimental to welfare. Morris and Shin (2002) suggest reducing the precision of public information or withholding it. The latter seems to be unrealistic. Thus, the issue is not whether central bank should disclose or not its information, but how the central bank should disclose it. We consider a static coordination game in which the private sector receives n semi-public information plus their specific information, and we analyse the impact on the private sector's welfare. The paper consists of three parts: (1) By making assumption that no costs are attached to the provision of private information, we determined the conditions under which the central bank faces a trade-o_ between enhancing commonality and the use of more precise, but fragmented information. Such intermediate transparent strategies may prevent the bad side of public information from overpowering the good side of it. (2) The latter result is found even in presence of positive externalities. (3) Introducing costs to that framework in equilibrium shows that strategic substitutability between semi-public and private precisions is a very likely outcome.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels in its series EERI Research Paper Series with number EERI_RP_2012_14.
Date of creation: 14 Sep 2012
Date of revision:
Transparency; Central bank Communication; semi public information; private information; static coordination game.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2012-09-30 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MON-2012-09-30 (Monetary Economics)
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- Emna Trabelsi & Walid Hichri, 2013.
"Central bank Transparency and Information Dissemination : An experimental Approach,"
1336, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
- Emna Trabelsi & Walid Hichri, 2013. "Central bank Transparency and Information Dissemination : An experimental Approach," Working Papers halshs-00915667, HAL.
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