This paper analyzes how the gossip process can be manipulated by biased people and the impact of such manipulation on information transmission. In this model, a single piece of information is transmitted via a chain of agents with privately known types. Each agent may be either objective or biased, with the latter type aiming to manipulate the information transmitted toward a given direction. In an indirect impact gossip model where all agents aim to influence a final decisionmaker, the biased type's equilibrium incentive to make up wrong information is independent of their position in the gossip chain. Moreover, adding just a few biased people to the population sharply decreases the amount of information transmitted. In a direct impact gossip model where every biased agent is concerned about influencing his immediate listener, gossip causes initial contamination of data, but eventually dies out as the objective people stop listening
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General