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Not Only What but Also When: A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure

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  • Guttman, Ilan

    (Stanford University)

  • Kremer, Ilan

    (Stanford University)

  • Skrzypacz, Andrzej

    (Stanford University)

Abstract

We study a dynamic strategic model of voluntary disclosure of multiple pieces of information. Such situations are prevalent in real life, e.g., in corporate disclosure environments that are characterized by information asymmetry between the firm and the capital market with respect to whether, when, and what private information the firm has learned. We show (perhaps surprisingly) that due to dynamic strategic interaction between the firm and the capital market later disclosures are interpreted more favorably. We also provide sufficient conditions for the equilibrium to be in threshold strategies.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Stanford University, Graduate School of Business in its series Research Papers with number 2102.

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Date of creation: Apr 2012
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Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:2102

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  1. Acharya, Viral V & DeMarzo, Peter & Kremer, Ilan, 2011. "Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of Announcements," CEPR Discussion Papers 8680, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Hyun Song Shin, 2006. "Disclosure Risk and Price Drift," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 351-379, 05.
  3. Verrecchia, Robert E., 1983. "Discretionary disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 179-194, April.
  4. Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-83, December.
  5. Grossman, S J & Hart, O D, 1980. " Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 35(2), pages 323-34, May.
  6. Pae, Suil, 2005. "Selective disclosures in the presence of uncertainty about information endowment," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 383-409, September.
  7. Eti Einhorn & Amir Ziv, 2008. "Intertemporal Dynamics of Corporate Voluntary Disclosures," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(3), pages 567-589, 06.
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