Informational Rents and Discretionary Industrial Assistance
AbstractThe paper analyses the existence and efficiency of discretionary industrial assistance schemes under asymmetric information between an uninformed government and a uniform distribution of firms with differing productivities. Discretionary assistance allows the government to scrutinise projects in an effort to learn the type to reduce the 'informational rents' of automatic assistance, where firms take up any contract on offer. Two discretionary grant schemes are analysed, which either exclude 'non-additional' projects or reduce the assistance to the minimum necessary for a project to proceed. The paper finds the conditions under which discretionary assistance exists and is more efficient than automatic assistance.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Royal Economic Society in its series Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 with number 222.
Date of creation: 04 Jun 2003
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More information through EDIRC
subsidies; asymmetric information; discretionary assistance; investment grants;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
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- Girma, Sourafel & Görg, Holger & Strobl, Eric & Walsh, Frank, 2007.
"Creating Jobs Through Public Subsidies: An Empirical Analysis,"
IZA Discussion Papers
3168, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Girma, Sourafel & Görg, Holger & Strobl, Eric & Walsh, Frank, 2008. "Creating jobs through public subsidies: An empirical analysis," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(6), pages 1179-1199, December.
- Walsh, Frank & Girmaa, Sourafel & Görg, Holger & Strobl, Eric, 2008. "Creating jobs through public subsidies : an empirical analysis," Open Access publications from University College Dublin urn:hdl:10197/185, University College Dublin.
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