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Fraud, investments and liability regimes in payment platforms

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  • Creti, Anna
  • Verdier, Marianne

Abstract

In this paper, we discuss how fraud liability regimes impact the price structure that is chosen by a monopolistic payment platform, in a setting where merchants can invest in fraud detection technologies. We show that liability allocation rules distort the price structure charged by platforms or banks to consumers and merchants with respect to a case where such a responsibility regime is not implemented. We determine the allocation of fraud losses between the payment platform and the merchants that maximises the platform's profit and we compare it to the allocation that maximises social welfare. JEL Classification: G21, L31, L42

Suggested Citation

  • Creti, Anna & Verdier, Marianne, 2011. "Fraud, investments and liability regimes in payment platforms," Working Paper Series 1390, European Central Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20111390
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Julian Wright, 2004. "The Determinants of Optimal Interchange Fees in Payment Systems," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(1), pages 1-26, March.
    2. Verdier, Marianne, 2010. "Interchange fees and incentives to invest in payment card systems," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(5), pages 539-554, September.
    3. Marianne Verdier, 2011. "Interchange Fees In Payment Card Systems: A Survey Of The Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 273-297, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    fraud; interchange fees; liability; payment card systems; two-sided markets;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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