Bidders' Entry and Auctioneers' Rejection: Applying a Double Selection Model to Road Procurement Auctions
AbstractLimited competition has been a serious concern in infrastructure procurement. Importantly, however, there are normally a number of potential bidders initially showing interest in proposed projects. This paper focuses on tackling the question why these initially interested bidders fade out. An empirical problem is that no bids of fading-out firms are observable. They could decide not to enter the process at the beginning of the tendering or may be technically disqualified at any point of the selection process. The paper applies the double selection model to procurement data from road development projects in developing countries and examines why competition ends up restricted. It shows that bidders are self-selective and auctioneers also tend to limit participation depending on the size of contracts. Then, limited competition would likely lead to high infrastructure procurement costs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its series Working Papers ECARES with number 2009_008.
Length: 25 p.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by:
Public procurement; auction theory; endogenous bidder entry; infrastructure development;
Other versions of this item:
- Estache, Antonio & Iimi, Atsushi, 2009. "Bidders'entry and auctioneer's rejection : applying a double selection model to road procurement auctions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4855, The World Bank.
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
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- Antonio Estache & A. Iimi, 2009.
"(Un)Bundling Infrastructure Procurement: Evidence from Water Supply and Sewage Projects,"
Working Papers ECARES
2009_007, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Estache, Antonio & Iimi, Atsushi, 2011. "(Un)bundling infrastructure procurement: Evidence from water supply and sewage projects," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 104-114, June.
- Estache, Antonio & Iimi, Atsushi, 2009. "(UN)Bundling infrastructure procurement : evidence from water supply and sewage projects," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4854, The World Bank.
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