Ordering Pareto-Optima Through Majority Voting
AbstractA commodity is shared between some individuals; some selection procedure is used to choose allocations. In order to reflect that laws and rules rather than allocations are implemented and that they involve an element of randomness because of incomplete information, selection procedures are taken to be probability measures over the set of allocations. Illustrations and interpretations of the selection procedures are given.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HEC Paris in its series Les Cahiers de Recherche with number 638.
Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 01 Feb 1998
Date of revision:
Pareto-optimal allocations; infra-majority voting;
Other versions of this item:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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