Have Incentive Based Policies Been Oversold? The Case of Non-Point Source Pollution in the Neuse River Basin
AbstractThis paper argues that past evaluations of the efficiency gains for command and control (CAC) versus incentive based (IB) environmental policies have been misleading. An analytical model of firm behavior in offering pollution permits for sale is used to demonstrate that the efficiency properties of a policy depend on how the policy design affects the excess demand (by other market participants) for permits. The importance of the argument to the estimated size of CAC/IB comparisons is illustrated with a large scale, nutrient balance model for the Neuse River Basin in North Carolina. The model includes both waste water treatment plants and non-point sources of nutrients and confirms the theoretical arguments.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Duke University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 98-15.
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics Duke University 213 Social Sciences Building Box 90097 Durham, NC 27708-0097
Phone: (919) 660-1800
Fax: (919) 684-8974
Web page: http://econ.duke.edu/
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Department of Economics Webmaster).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.