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Have Incentive Based Policies Been Oversold? The Case of Non-Point Source Pollution in the Neuse River Basin

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  • Schwabe, Kurt A.
  • Smith, V. Kerry

Abstract

This paper argues that past evaluations of the efficiency gains for command and control (CAC) versus incentive based (IB) environmental policies have been misleading. An analytical model of firm behavior in offering pollution permits for sale is used to demonstrate that the efficiency properties of a policy depend on how the policy design affects the excess demand (by other market participants) for permits. The importance of the argument to the estimated size of CAC/IB comparisons is illustrated with a large scale, nutrient balance model for the Neuse River Basin in North Carolina. The model includes both waste water treatment plants and non-point sources of nutrients and confirms the theoretical arguments.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Duke University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 98-15.

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Date of creation: 1998
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Handle: RePEc:duk:dukeec:98-15

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Postal: Department of Economics Duke University 213 Social Sciences Building Box 90097 Durham, NC 27708-0097
Phone: (919) 660-1800
Fax: (919) 684-8974
Web page: http://econ.duke.edu/

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