This paper proposes an explanation of the puzzling coexistence of elements of inertia and dynamism on the Russian labour market using a segmentation model. Risl averse workers are differentiated according to their productivity. They face a trade-off between wages and access to social services provided by firms. The most productive workers leave their initial firm, contract on the spot labour market, and concentrate in the best performing firms. The model provides a possible interpretation of wage arrears which can be viewed as an element of an implicit contract between firms and less productive workers. We verify the predictions of the model using a panel dataset containing 13 628 firms, for 1992-1997.
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Length: 25 pages Date of creation: 1999 Date of revision: Publication status: Published in Journal of Comparative Economics, 2001 Handle: RePEc:del:abcdef:1999-03
Find related papers by JEL classification: P23 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Factor and Product Markets; Industry Studies; Population J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
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