Illustrating Adverse Selection in Health Insurance Markets with a Classroom Game
AbstractThis paper describes a classroom game that illustrates the effects of asymmetric information and adverse selection in health insurance markets. The first part of this game simulates a market in which buyers can purchase insurance from sellers; in some periods, government regulation of the insurance market prevents sellers from using information about buyer type to determine premiums. The results demonstrate the classic prediction that asymmetric information will result in adverse selection. Here, low risk buyers will forego the purchase of insurance at a measurable loss of potential earnings. In the second part of the game, sellers and buyers can trade two different types of health insurance policies, one moderate and another generous. The results from this part show that adverse selection can lead to an inefficient sorting of buyers across plans under government-mandated community rating and limits on premium increases. Under these circumstances, no buyers will purchase the generous insurance plan. The paper provides a series of questions to stimulate class discussion on the causes and consequences of adverse selection for consumers and insurers, and solutions that can be implemented in employer and government-sponsored programs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, College of William and Mary in its series Working Papers with number 11.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 10 Dec 2004
Date of revision: 18 Mar 2005
Classroom; Experiment; Adverse selection;
Other versions of this item:
- Jennifer M. Mellor, 2005. "Illustrating Adverse Selection in Health Insurance Markets with a Classroom Game," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 502â515, October.
- A2 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
- I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-01-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2005-01-02 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HEA-2005-01-02 (Health Economics)
- NEP-IAS-2005-01-02 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2005-01-02 (Microeconomics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
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