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Kantian Allocations

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Author Info
John E. Roemer () (Dept. of Political Science and Economics, Yale University)

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Abstract

Several authors in the economics literature have referred to Kantian behavior, informally, as a kind of cooperation. We model this notion precisely, and define two kinds of Kantian allocation. An set of strategies by players is Kantian if, informally, no player would advocate that all players change their strategies in the 'same kind of way.' We prove existence and Pareto efficiency of Kantian allocations. The proportional solution in a production economy with a common access technology emerges as a special case. We study whether Kantian behavior can 'resolve' the prisoners' dilemma and the voting paradox. It turns out that Kant's categorical imperative only implies cooperation (solidaristic behavior) conditional upon the rewards to cooperation being sufficiently great, perhaps a sobering thought for philosophical Kantians who believe that Kant's categorical imperative implies a strong kind of solidarity.

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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d15b/d1582.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Cowles Foundation, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1582.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1582

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Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
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Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

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Related research
Keywords: Cooperative solution; Proportional solution; Voting paradox; Prisoners' dilemma; Kant; Categorical imperative;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

Cited by:
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  1. Tasos Kalandrakis, 2006. "Robust Rational Turnout," Wallis Working Papers WP44, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
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